How do organizations make strategic choices during the time of fundamental institutional transitions such as those sweeping numerous emerging economies? To answer this question, a two-phase model of institutional transitions is developed in this article. I focus on the longitudinal process to move from a relationship-based, personalized transaction structure calling for a network-centered strategy to a rule-based. Impersonal exchange regime suggesting a market-centered strategy. I then identify the points of inflection; predict strategic choices for incumbent, entrepreneurial, and foreign firms; and delineate their performance implications.
How do organizations make strategic choices during the time of fundamental and comprehensive institutional transitions? In three decades of research since the publication of Child's (1972) seminal paper, researchers have produced an impressive body of knowledge on how strategic choices are made (Child, 1997; Oliver, 1991) . However, most of their studies focus on strategic choices in relatively stable institutional environments. Even when scholars study how organizations respond to institutional transitions, they typically concentrate on changes in one industry while the overall institutional framework of the country remains mostly unchanged. Such industry-specific changes, however, pale in comparison with the massive institutional transitions taking place in many emerging economies. Unfortunately, little is known about how organizations make strategic choices when confronting such large-scale institutional transitions.
Since institutions are typically conceptualized as "the rules of the game in a society" (North, 1990: 3; Scott, 1995) , institutional transitions can be defined as fundamental and comprehensive changes introduced to the formal and informal rules of the game that affect organizations as players. Institutional transitions in some emerging economies, especially those moving from central planning to market competition (e.g., China, Poland, Russia), are so pervasive that these economies are simply labeled transition economies {Peng, 2000). Yet, although institutional change has emerged as a central focus for organizational researchers {Academy of Management journal. 2002) , they have not paid adequate attention to these wide-ranging transitions, until recently (Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000) . Compared with other fields (e.g., economics), in which substantial research on transition issues has visibly influenced international organizations, such as the World Bank (2002) , in the long run, the organization and strategy field's tendency to eschew engagement with these major transitions around the world may keep the field "on the sidelines in debates about issues in which it potentially has much to contribute" (Pfeffer, 1997: 24) .
In this article my motivation stems from the unique experimental setting that these transitions permit to extend the literature on how organizations make strategic choices during fundamental institutional transitions, thus helping correct the parochial tendency that Pfeffer (1997) cautioned against. Specifically, I advance the
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April argument that institutional transitions throughout emerging economies present a fascinating opportunity to integrate institutional and strategic choice perspectives. Scholars now hardly debate that institutions matter {North, 1990; Scott, 1995) . In order to make further theoretical progress, researchers must "tackle the harder and more interesting issues of how they [institutions] matter, under what circumstances, to what extent, and in what ways" (Powell, 1996: 297) . Recently, Hoskisson and colleagues (2000: 263) speculated that, as emerging economies evolve, institutional theory, which focuses on interorganizational relationships, may first become most relevant, and then, later on, resourcebased theory, which centers on firm-specific capabilities, is likely to be more relevant. In earlier work I argued that research on emerging economies is especially conducive for integration between institutional and resource-based theories (Peng, 2001b: 821) . However, the mechanisms of such integration remain largely unknown. Here I take on this challenge by focusing on how institutional transitions matter for strategic choices.
Among many possible institutional transitions, I concentrate on a particular subset, which is identified by the World Bank (2002) as the most salient for emerging economies as they move toward more market competition. In particular, I develop a two-phase model of marfceforiented institutional transitions, focusing on the longitudinal process to move from a relationship-based, personalized transaction structure calling for a network-centered strategy to a rule-based, impersonal exchange regime suggesting a market-centered strategy. This focus also resonates with recent findings that, as some emerging economies become more competitive, networks and connections, previously thought to be imperative for business success, no longer seem as important as before (Child & Tse, 2001; Guthrie, 1998; lohnson, McMillan, & Woodruff, 2000; Peng & Luo, 2000) . Yet what leads to these changes is unclear. In response, I identify the points of inflection of institutional transitions, predict different strategic choices, and delineate their performance implications.
This article represents a departure from the existing literature in at least three significant ways. First, it highlights the context of fundamental institutional changes. In particular, I integrate the ideas of Child (1972 Child ( , 1997 and Oliver (1991 Oliver ( , 1992 , in a dynamic setting, by drawing on Scott's (1995) explication of the three institutional "pillars." I also extend Newman's (2000) analysis of intraorganizational changes by covering both intraorganizational changes (e.g., internal resource building) and interorganizational solutions (e.g., interfirm networks). Second, I develop a two-phase model of institutional transitions by explicating the important but often missed turning points of these transitions. Finally, this article extends my previous work on an institution-based view of strategy (Peng, , 20aib, 2002 Peng & Heath, 1996) that stems from research on a broad range of emerging economies, which organizational scholars can no longer afford to ignore.
INSTITUTIONS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STRATEGIC CHOICES
Throughout the social sciences, the rise of new institutionalism in the last two decades has necessitated a deeper understanding of the interaction between institutions and organizations.^ Building on the "rules-of-the-game" metaphor. North more formally defines institutions as "the humanly devised constraints that structure human interaction" (1990: 3), which include formal rules (laws, regulations) and informal constraints (customs, norms, cultures). Scott (1995) argues that, at the most fundamental level, institutions have three "pillars." First, the reguiafive pillar focuses on formal rule systems and enforcement mechanisms sanctioned by the state (North, 1990) . Second, the normative pillar defines legitimate means to pursue valued ends (Scott, 1995) . Finally, the cognitive pillar refers to taken-for-granted beliefs and values that are imposed on, or internalized by, social actors (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . These three pillars of institutions provide three "related but distinguishable bases of legitimacy" (Scott, 1995: 47) . In response, organizations acquiesce to a variety of institutional pressures by making strate-' Although the economic (e.g.. North, 1990 ) and sociological (e.g., Scott, 1995) versions of institutional theory have some diflerences, they are broadly complementary [Scott, 1995) . Following Peng and Heath, who suggest that "a combination of the two is natural" ior management research (1996: 499), here I draw on the best available insights irom the institutional literature, regardless oi their disciplinary backgrounds.
gic choices, such as compliance, cooptation, and defiance (Child, 1972 (Child, , 1997 Oliver, 1991 Oliver, , 1992 .
Thus far, most research focusing on "fundamental" institutional transitions has been limited to industry-specific changes in a single country. Examples include the savings and loan (Haveman, 1992; Zajac, Kraatz, & Bresser, 2000) , railroad (Dobbin & Dowd, 1997) , broadcasting (Leblebici, Salancik, Copay, & King, 1991) , and health care (D'Aunno, Succi, & Alexander, 2000; Ruef & Scott, 1998) industries in the United States. According to Oliver (1992) , large-scale, discontinuous institutional transitions can be termed deinstitutionalization. which refers to the erosion or discontinuity of an institutionalized organizational practice. Given the traditional emphasis on institutional pressures leading to organizational conformity, the institutional theory literature may have "overlooked the potentially significant role of deinstitutionalization in explaining organizational behavior and change" (Oliver, 1992: 564) .
Since one of the unique challenges of deinstitutionalization is that existing organizational routines may erode and become obsolete (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) , how organizations strategize during fundamental institutional transitions still remains largely unknown. Much less is known about how organizations reject old rules, learn new routines, and develop new capabilities (Oliver, 1992) . These questions can only be answered by "examining and comprehending organizations operating in other places" (Scott, 1995: 148) , such as emerging economies. As a result, scholars "must take advantage of these 'natural' experiments" (Scott, 1995: 148; Shenkar & von Glinow, 1994 : 56)-hence my focus here.
A FOCUS ON EMERGING ECONOMIES
Emerging economies are "low-income, rapidgrowth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine of growth" (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 249) . The terms emerging economies and (ransifiorj economies are often seen but rarely defined in the literature. According to authoritative publications, such as those by the World Bank (2002), transition economies, which are a subset of emerging economies, are formerly socialist countries in East Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. Emerging economies not only include transition economies but also economies in Latin America, the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Africa, Compared with industry-specific changes in the West, institutional transitions in emerging economies are "qualitatively different" (Newman, 2000: 602) . The pace and source of these transitions have varied dramatically. While some countries (e.g., Poland, Russia) chose to "drop" central planning through shock therapies, others (e.g., China, Vietnam) attempted to gradually "grow out of" central planning through gradualist policies. Some countries (e.g.. South Korea, Thailand) initiated major policy reforms under external, international demands, whereas others (e.g., Chile, India) unleashed policy shocks because of internal pressures.
Overall, the scale and scope of these transitions are unprecedented in recent history. As a result, from Shanghai to St. Petersburg, from Seoul to Sao Paulo, market competition has dramatically intensified. It was not long ago that competition was all but absent. Markets were closed, industries protected, and strategizing not necessary. In contrast, pervasive changes are now the striking feature, thus calling for firms to employ diverse competitive strategies to navigate the turbulent waters of institutional transitions .
However, numerous publications in the market transition literature concentrate on state-level policies, such as liberalization and privatization, and leave firm-level strategies relatively unexplored, other than the naive belief that competitive strategies will "naturally" emerge (e.g.. World Bank, 2002) . Unfortunately, during the transitions, firms often do not behave as reformers and their foreign advisors hoped they would (e.g., privatization but no restructuring), leading to a lot of frustration (Stiglitz, 1999) . Such frustration reflects a lack of understanding of how firms are likely to respond to fundamental institutional changes-a gap I believe organizational and strategy researchers may be able to help fill.
A TWO-PHASE MODEL OF INSTITUTIONAL TRANSITIONS

Incremental versus Discontinuous Transitions
Market-oriented institutional transitions vary in the extent to which they are incremental or discontinuous. First, North suggests that the process of institutional change is "overwhelmingly an incremental one," because change typically April "consists of marginal adjustments to the complex of rules, norms, and enforcement that constitute the institutional framework " (1990: 83) . Second, although the ideas of Gersick (1991) and Tushman and Romanelli (1985) originally focused on the organizational level, they can be extended to deal with higher, institutional-level changes because of their multilevel coverage (Gersick, 1991) . These researchers argue that although institutions evolve through relatively long periods of stability (equilibrium) during which incremental changes occur, such an evolution is also likely to be punctuated by discontinuous transformations-hence the term punctuated equilibrium.
Despite the seeming contradiction between these two perspectives, a combination of incremental and fundamental change processes is likely to be observed in the real world. In particular, periods of incremental changes tend to be disrupted by more discontinuous transformations. For instance, Dobbin and Dowd (1997) document how major changes in the ground rules of competition policy affected the entries and exits of railroads in Massachusetts in the nineteenth century. Ruef and Scott (1998) probe how incremental and discontinuous changes coevolved in the U.S. health care industry in the twentieth century.
Similarly, recent experience from emerging economies confirms that what appears fundamental may have strong incremental underpinnings. First, some fundamental institutional changes can indeed happen overnight. For example, throughout Central and Eastern Europe, central planning was abolished, markets liberalized, and private ownership legalized-all with the stroke of a pen in the early 1990s. Second, the pace of dismantling the old institutions does not necessarily coincide with the construction of new institutions, thus leaving a period of incremental evolution full of uncertainties. Finally, "although formal rules may change overnight as the result of political and judicial decisions, informal constraints embodied in customs, traditions, and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies" (North, 1990: 6) . Specifically, "informal constraints rise to play a laigei role in regulating economic exchanges in these countries during the transition, and have considerable influence over both the behavior of individual managers and their firms, as well as the generation of new formal constraints" (Peng & Heath, 1996: 504, emphasis added) .
In sum, institutional transitions seem to be crossroads whereby the deep structure {Gersick, 1991) of old institutions gradually gives way to new ones, thus leading to initially ambiguous but increasingly identifiable points of inflection.
Points of Inflection
In this section I develop a two-phase model of market-oriented institutional transitions. This model rests on a critical assumption-that is, as time goes by, the economy is likely to feature more complex transactions involving more transaction parties, which is a trend consistent with the broad historical pattern associated with economic development around the world (World Bank, 2002) . It is important to clarify that this assumption does not necessarily suggest economic growth (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; 399) . Given the instability associated with the transitions, it is possible that although some countries (e.g., China} achieve strong economic growth, others (e.g., Russia) may experience economic decline. Nevertheless, I contend that the Russian economy of 2001, despite having experienced a decade of decline in GDP, was still more complex than that of 1991, when the former Soviet Union collapsed, as measured by the diversity of participants and the scale and scope of market processes.
Since the role of institutions is "to reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable (but not necessarily efficient) structure to human interaction . . , institutions affect the performance of the economy by their effect on the costs of exchange and production" (North, 1990: 5-6 ). Therefore, market-oriented institutional transitions can be conceptualized as moving from one primary mode of exchange to another mode in order to reduce uncertainty. However, these institutional transitions are likely to introduce, at least in the short run, considerable chaos and increased costs, as new institutions emerge to replace old ones (Oliver, 1992) . On the one hand, while institutions constantly evolve and change in most countries, poorly performing economies in particular tend to produce political conflict and tension, as certain new entrant groups (people and organizations who stand to gain by the changes) may try to change the rules of the game. On the other hand, incumbent groups (parties well es- tablished in the economy because of the existing rules of the game) may resist, thus resulting in a period of institutional upheaval (Oliver, 1992; Skott, 1999) . Although transaction structures vary tremendously around the world, researchers in sociology (Fukuyama, 1995) , economics (North, 1990) , and management (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999; Pearce, 2001) , as well as international organizations (World Bank, 2002) , generally agree that these structures can be broadly grouped in two ways. Known as "relational contracting," the first is relationship-based, personalized exchange that "has characterized most of economic history" (North, 1990: 34) . Initially, at time Tl in Figure 1 , the costs to engage in relational contracting are high (at point A) and the benefits low (at point B), because transaction parties need to build strong social networks through a time-and resource-consuming process. When the scale, scope, and specificity of transactions expand, the costs per transaction are likely to move down (from A to C and then to E) and benefits move up (from B to C and, further, to D), since the threat of opportunism is limited by the extent to which informal sanction may be imposed against opportunists if necessary. There is little demand for costly, formal, rule-based, third-party enforcement. Thus, between T2 and T3, the economy is likely to benefit from relational contracting.
Past time T3, however, the costs of such a mode may gradually outweigh the benefits, because "the greater the variety and numbers of exchange, the more complex the kinds of agreements that have to be made, and so the more difficult it is to do so" in the absence of formal institutions (North, 1990: 34) . Specifically, given the expansion of transactions in a complex economy, there is a limit as to the number and strength of network ties an individual or organization can possess.^ Especially when the informal enforcement regime is weak, trust can be easily exploited and abused. As a result, the limit of relational contracting is Ukely to be reached at time T3, when the cost and benefit This argument rests on two assumptions. First, the number of strong ties an individual or firm can meaningiully maintain is smaller than the number of weak ties. Second, although weak ties can certainly be beneficial (Burt, 1997) , there still is a limit as to how many weak ties an individual or organization can have, beyond which benefits may be difficult to derive. AprU curves reach their points of inflection. Past T4, the costs are likely to gradually outweigh the benefits (World Bank, 2002) .
Often termed arm's length transaction, the second transaction mode is rule-based, impersonal exchange with third-party enforcement. As the economy expands, the scale, scope, and specificity of transactions rise exponentially, calling for the emergence of third-party enforcement through formal legal and regulatory regimes. These rules and regulations are different from bureaucratic ones, such as those found in many former Soviet-type economies that are hostile to market competition. While bureaucratic rules may have certain benefits (e.g., accomplishing priority goals in military and space programs), they tend to result in massive market failure (Peng, 2000: 20-40) . Such a failure leads individuals and organizations interested in market exchange to resort to informal, relationship-based exchange, thus triggering the transitions (Rose, 2000) . Instead, the new rules and regulations can be better characterized as market-supporting formal institutions designed to facilitate more impersonal economic exchange (World Bank, 2002) . Figure 2 , the initial costs per transaction are high, because of the high costs to develop and implement formal institutions (e.g., courts). Over time, however, third-party enforcement is likely to facilitate the widening of markets, because unfamiliar parties, who would have been deterred from transacting before, are now confident enough to trade with each other in order to capture the gains from more complex exchanges (lohnson et al., 2000) . Therefore, formal market-supporting institutions may facilitate more new entries by lowering transaction costs, thereby stimulating more economic expansion (Williamson, 1985) . Heralded as a key characteristic of the market economy, rulebased, impersonal exchange has been regarded as "the critical underpinning of successful modern economies involved in the complex contracting necessary for modern economic growth" (North, 1990: 35) .
Shown in
Throughout emerging economies, despite the openly proclaimed objective of becoming "market economies," the transitions typically end up with a predominantly relationship-based transaction structure first and then may gradually move to a second, rule-based structure. This The transitions start at Tl, when the costs of relationship-based transactions begin to drop and the benefits begin to rise. This is due to the emergence of new opportunities as the economic landscape is being shaped (Stark, 1996) . Historical practices associated with informal trading may also give legitimacy to this way of doing business (Rose, 2000) . In the process (especially between T2 and T3) many firms survive and grow by using a network-based strategy based on personal trust and informal agreements among managers and officials in order to overcome the institutional uncertainties (Guillen, 2000; Peng & Heath. 1996) . However, past the points of inflection, D and E, the expanding scale and scope of transactions gradually require formal institutional mechanisms to support the increasingly complex transaction structure. But the process between Tl and T3 is long, and the changes tend to be incremental (Lawrence, Winn, & Jennings, 2001; North, 1990) .
At the critical T3, the accumulated momentum toward having more formal rules finally starts to overcome the inertia in the deep structure of the previous mode of transaction (Leblebici et al., 1991; Skott, 1999) . Since "state and societal forces in the organization's environment are among the most critical agents of institutional change" (Oliver, 1992: 576) , sources of such a momentum may include changes in political regimes (e.g., the Velvet Revolution in the former Czechoslovakia), shifts in economic policies (e.g., the accession to the World Trade Organization in China), and pressures from international interests (e.g., the reforms mandated by the International Monetary Fund in South Korea). Sudden, revolutionary changes in institutional frameworks are likely to occur at this point (Gersick, 1991; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) .
Achieving an identifiable break with the past, the economy moves Into a new, rule-based phase. This phase is almost certain to require a long period of incremental evolution, because of (1) the lack of a sufficient number of rules to govern all transactions (North, 1990) ; (2) the lack of credible enforcement of the rules that do exist (Stiglitz, 1999) ; and (3) the tremendous inertia, resistance, and lack of adaptation on the part of (Newman, 2000; Oliver, 1992) . Therefore, unless the economy reaches point G at T5, the costs per transaction of relying on the new rules are still likely to outweigh their benefits, thus creating incentives for some (but not all) firms to continue to rely on networks. Only past T5 will the benefits of a rule-based transaction regime be obtained.
Although there is a great deal of diversity across emerging economies, the transformation toward more rule-based market transactions seems to have taken place-of course, with different paces and setbacks-around the world. This does not necessarily mean that arm's length transactions are inherently better, because "in many situations the demand for new and modern institutions may not be evident" (World Bank, 2002: 177) . Both forms of exchange complement each other. On the one hand, relational contracting has an advantage over formal institutions in that participants may have better information than any third party (e.g., courts), especially when the size of the economy is limited. Its disadvantage is that it may cause firms to stick with established networks and relationships, rather than work with new, untried trading partners, thereby creating barriers to entry. As transaction complexity increases, informal information processing and enforcement within the group may become difficult. This is because informal commitments are more difficult to coordinate and deviations harder to punish. Arm's length transactions, on the other hand, help overcome these barriers, by bringing together formerly distant groups (firms, communities, and even countries) to enjoy the gains from complicated long-distance trade. These rule-based transactions thus become increasingly attractive as more new players enter the game.
It is important to note that economy-level institutions not only reflect the current sets of market-and nonmarket-based rules but also the historical sets of norms and experiences (Moran & Ghoshal, 1999) . In other words, there is a great deal of path dependency governing institutional choices and transitions. Thus, the institutional transitions toward having more rule-based market exchange do not-and will not-completely eradicate relationship-based dealings. In fact, developed economies, such as France, Italy, lapan, and Sweden, continue to feature substantial elements of network-based business groups {Fukuyama, 1995). Among developed economies that seem to operate a similar, rule-based framework, there are significant, historically derived differences among their approaches to the rule of law (e.g., the Anglo-American common law tradition versus the French/German/Scandinavian civil law tradition)."^ However, overall, the differences among developed economies are probably small relative to their differences from emerging economies (Young et al., 2002) . Therefore, in this article I focus on emerging economies, which exhibit the largest amount of institutional variance relative to the familiar, developed economies often featured in the literature (Peng & Heath, 1996) .
The Time of Transitions
The time of transitions embodied in the twophase model of institutional transitions poses a significant challenge to scholars, because the points of inflection identified above render linear predictions, typical in organizational research, inapplicable (Child & Tse, 2001: 18) . Since organizations exist in and through time, it is possible that no organizational theory is truly "holochronic" (relationships exist independent of time [Zaheer, Albert, & Zaheer, 1999: 734] ). Viewed from this perspective, most existing theories may be incomplete, because theorists seldom spell out the relevant time scales explicitly. To make further progress, a necessary first step is "to make explicit the time scales implicit in existing work ... by a full specification of all relevant time scales" (Zaheer et al., 1999: 739) .
This argument is particularly salient for emerging economies, because the very term emeiging economies suggests a time-related process (Hoskisson et al., 2000) . However, Newman suggests that one of the weaknesses of this research is "its inattention to time " (2000: 616) . Typically based on cross-sectional data, studies often fail to provide "temporal benchmarks for organizational transformation" (Newman, 2000: For example, relative to common law countries, many French (e.g.. France, Italy) and German/Scandinavian (e.g., Japan, Sweden) civil law countries have weaker law enforcement and accounting standards, and these differences may lead to the persistence of networks (La Porta, Lopezde-Silanes, Shleiier, & Vishny, 1998) . However, these networks are relatively more transparent and less exclusionary compared with those in emerging economies (Young, Peng, Ahlstrom, & Bruton, 2002) . 616). The results, while valid at a given point in time, may not hold longitudinally. Improving on such previous research, I endeavor to predict strategic choices during institutional transitions by temporally bracketing them in two phases: (1) those between Tl and T3 and (2) those between T3 and T5 in Figure 3 , which I simply term earJy and late phases ol the transitions. Such a "temporal bracketing" approach thus "enables the explicit examination ol how actions of one period lead to changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent periods" (Langley, 1999: 703) .
STRATEGIC CHOICES AND ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
Strategic choices during institutional transitions essentially focus on the question, How do organizations play the new game when the new rules are not completely known? Many organizations may initially exhibit extensive inertia as they wait for the new institutional realities to become better defined. Although divergent organizational changes are likely to be triggered by both market and nonmarket forces, these forces may be inconsistent and conflicting {D 'Aunno et al., 2000; Oliver, 1992) . As a result, there may also be a good deal of apparent randomness as many firms display strategically confused behavior because they are unable to cope with the rapid changes (Newman, 2000) .
Nevertheless, out of such chaos two primary strategic choices seem to have emerged (Leblebici et al., 1991; Powell, 1996) . The first one may be considered a network-based strategy, emphasizing intangible assets embodied in managers' interpersonal ties and firms' interorganizational relationships with various players (Powell, 1990) . The second one may be regarded as a market-based strategy, concentrating on competitive resources and capabilities emphasized in traditional strategy research (e.g., quality, financing, and marketing), which are independent of the firm's networks, relationships, and connections (Barney, 1991) . Although some scholars have recently treated networks as resources, especially when an alliance strategy is employed (Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000) , here I-for lack of a better word-follow the traditional notion of "resources" and "capabilities" as found in the resource-based literature (Barney, 1991) , which is independent of networks and relationships.
In the context of emerging economies, different authors have debated over which is the more appropriate strategy. Some view a networkbased strategy as a winning option in the absence of formal market-supporting institutions (Peng & Heath, 1996; Spicer, McDermott, & Kogut, 2000) . Others complain that too much emphasis has been put on institutional environments that lead to networks (White, 2000: 339) . These authors argue that informal networks are a hotbed of corruption and cronyism and that the construction of formal institutions may enable more firms to compete on market-based capabilities (Stiglitz, 1999) . While it is possible that different strategies may be useful during different phases of the transitions, the mechanisms of such a shift still remain to be explored.
As the transitions progress, more new entrants join the game and organizational diversity increases, resulting in three major organizational forms. These are (1) incumbent firms (primarily business groups, state-owned enterprises, and privatized firms), (2) entrepreneurial start-ups, and (3) foreign entrants. These organizations often interact with one another through competition and/or collaboration (e.g., as alliance partners), thus influencing each other's strategic choices and (together with regulatory agencies) constituting an "organization field" (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) .'' Unfortunately, most previous research only focuses on one type of firm (e.g., Peng & Heath, 1996 , on incumbents), thus failing to capture the interactions among these organizational forms. Yet collective beliefs regarding certain appropriate strategic choices emerge from repeated interactions both within each type of firm and across different types of firms (Leblebici et al., 1991) . Attempting to connect different strands of the literature with a single, unifying framework on such an emerging organizational field. I highlight here the strategic choices of these three major types of firms during the two phases of transitions.
•* DiMaggio and Powell more iormally deiine an organization tield as "sets of organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute an area ol institutional life; key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations ihat produce similar services or products" (1983: 148-149 ).
During the transitions, different organizational forms are likely to confront different institutional pressures, of the sort suggested by Scott's (1995) "three pillars" (regulative, normative, and cognitive pressures), thus leading to various strategic choices. While some of these choices are based on a cost-benefit analysis, not all of them are likely to be efficiency driven (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) . Some choices, while possible, are highly deterministic once made. Many choices may be made based on history and mimicry, especially during the early, chaotic phase of transitions. Only when institutional frameworks stabilize are there increasing pressures to optimize and build competitive marketbased capabilities. Summarized in Table 1, I develop these arguments more fully in the next two sections.
STRATEGIC CHOICES DURING THE EARLY PHASE OF TRANSITIONS
During the early phase of transitions (between Tl and T3 in Figure 3 ), uncertainties in formal institutional constraints often force managers to rely on informal, interpersonal relationships-not only with managers at other firms but also with government officials (Peng & Heath, 1996) . Armed with useful ties and contacts, a manager thus "becomes an entrepreneur in the literal sense of the word-a person who adds value by brokering the connection between others" (Burt, 1997: 342) . Therefore, managers' microlevel interpersonal relationships with other players may result in a macrolevel strategy of relying on interfirm ties to achieve organizational goals-in short, a micro-macro link (Peng 8E Luo, 2000) . Past T2, as the economy develops and demands more specialized and sophisticated transactions, informal, relationshipbased dealings-in the absence of formal institutions-are likely to be the most feasible avenue of exchange, where the benefits may outweigh the costs (especially between T2 and T3).
As predicted by Peng and Heath (1996) , during the initial phase of the transitions, an intensification of relationship networks has been reported empirically throughout numerous emerging economies, such as Argentina (Guillen, 2000) , Chile (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) , China (Keister, 2000; Peng & Luo, 2000; Xin & Pearce, 1996) , the Czech Republic (Makhija, in press; Newman, 2000) , Hungary (Rona-Tas, 1994; Stark, 1996) , India (Khanna & Palepu, 1999) , Poland (Spicer et al., 2000) , Russia (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001; Rose, 2000) , and South Korea (Chang & Hong, 2000) . The broad range of these countries with different cultural traditions and transition trajectories suggests that the convergence on this network-based strategy is not likely to be driven by national culture alone but, rather, more significantly by common institutional characteristics-in particular, the lack of formal market institutions-during the transitions (Peng, , 2002 . 
Incumbent Firms
Despite the convergence on such a general strategy, different firms are likely to differ in their emphasis because of the different institutional pressures they face (Table 1) . Incumbent firms used to be the central players prior to the transitions, and their practices define institutional norms. However, the better the fit they have with the pretransition institutional context, the more difficult it is for them to successfully transform themselves. During this phase, the lack of effective formal rules and regulations suggests that the regulative pressures to compel these firms to engage in impersonal, marketbased exchange are likely to be minimal. Likewise, the normative pressures for incumbents to engage in such exchange are weak, because these firms historically do not have such a norm (Oliver, 1992) , nor have they internalized a set of cognitive beliefs that value market-based competitive behavior. In other words, there is little cognitive pressure to motivate them to seek competitive solutions.
Instead, whenever confronting difficulties, incumbents tend to extract more protection from the government. Thus, some incumbents may attempt to leverage their deeply embedded relationships with regulatory authorities (Guillen, 2000; Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Makhija. in press). In terms of real changes in competitive capabilities, many incumbents may not actively initiate strategic transformation; instead, because of organizational inertia, they may only react to the crisis of the day as it occurs, hoping to "muddle through" the transitions with minimal changes (McCarthy & Puffer, 1995) .
Globally, three sets of supportive evidence emerge. First, in Chile and India, established business groups, when facing new liberalization policies, significantly enhanced-instead of reduced-their scope by extending network ties with more sectors of the economy (Khanna & Palepu, 1999) . Second, in China, state-owned firms, despite some improvement, continue to lack dynamism compared with their non-stateowned competitors (Tan & Litschert, 1994; White, 2000) . Finally, throughout Central and Eastern Europe, a large number of privatized firms have undertaken very little restructuring, continuing to do business "as usual," including substantial networking with players new and old (Filatotchev. Buck, & Zhukov, 2000) . Choosing a "muddling through" strategy may be a rational choice for those firms facing a bewildering institutional environment, because when the rules of the game are highly uncertain, many organizations will be unable to develop new capabilities and "so will virtually by default continue to carry out much the same activities in similar ways as before" (Peng, 2000: 145) . Figure  3 ), incumbent firms are more likely than other types of firms to compete primarily on the basis of networks and relationships, as opposed to competitive resources and capabilities.
Proposition 1: During the early phase of transitions (between Tl and T3 in
Entrepreneurial Start-Ups
As fringe players, start-ups face a different set of institutional pressures. On the one hand, the regulative pressures for them to engage in impersonal, market-based exchange are likely to be weak, owing to the absence of formal institutions. Instead, they need to rapidly build ties with larger and more powerful players in order to establish legitimacy, thus necessitating an intense networking strategy. They have to cultivate two sets of networks. The first is professional networks with entrepreneurs and managers at other firms, such as suppliers, buyers, and competitors (Aldrich, 1999) . The second is political networks with government officials, which may be more important, given the extensive involvement of the government (Peng & Luo, 2000) . Overall, between Tl and T3, new entrants may be especially interested in building entrepreneurial networks to compensate for their lack of formal institutional protection (Xin & Pearce, 1996) .
On the other hand, start-ups also need to focus on building competitive capabilities independent of their networks and connections. Startups cannot compete against the larger and more established rivals head on. Instead, they often have to compete on resourcefulness-that is, doing more with less (Peng, 2001a) . During this process, a new norm centered on market competition is likely to emerge, because as latecomers, start-ups have to prove themselves as legitimate players with high-quality products and services. The new normative pressures to engage in market competition are likely to be mod-erate-that is, stronger than those incumbent firms face yet weaker than those start-ups in developed economies encounter. This is because the new norm is being formed in the absence of previous history of entrepreneurial participation in major transactions. Yet entrepreneurs instinctively know that they need to differentiate themselves from incumbents. In other words, the need to engage in market competition may become an emerging set of beliefs and values internalized by entrepreneurs, thus leading to increasingly strong cognitive pressures to engage in market-based, as opposed to relationship-based, exchange.
In terms of how strong these new normative and cognitive pressures for market-based competition are, it is important to note that entrepreneurs who lead these firms come from different backgrounds (Peng, 2001a} . Some of them, such as older, former government officials, may have acquired substantial experience during the pretransition era. Facing relatively few normative and cognitive pressures to pursue competitive solutions, they will naturally rely heavily on networks and connections for survival in the early years of transitions (Rona-Tas, 1994). Other entrepreneurs, such as younger professionals, may be trained during the transition era with little or no previous experience. Thus, it is easier for them to form and accept a new norm centered on market competition, leading to heightened normative and cognitive pressures to engage in such actions. Figure 3 ), entrepreneurial start-ups are more likely than other types of firms fo compete primarily on the basis of both (1) 
Proposition 2a: During the early phase ol transitions (between Tl and T3 in
Foreign Entrants
Many foreign entrants view emerging economies as major growth opportunities they cannot afford to ignore (Peng, 2000: 199) . Their strategic choices center on whether (1) to adapt to local conditions by playing the networking game or (2) to maintain their familiar mode of operations by leveraging their global competitive resources (Boisot & Child, 1999: 247) . The first alternative is to "go local." Since learning how to compete in an unfamiliar environment is time consuming, these foreign entrants do not emphasize the speed of learning but focus, rather, on the depth and effectiveness of such endeavors (Luo & Peng, 1999) . Therefore, they prefer to have joint ventures and alliances with local partners, downplay their foreign image by using some local brands, and delay global standardization moves. They tend to develop long-term relationships with a diverse set of local players and to employ experienced local managers, as opposed to expatriates, in order to facilitate incountry networking.
The second alternative is to reduce environmental complexity by imposing familiar routines and standards upon these new markets (Boisot & Child, 1999) . The aim is to bring local operations "up to speed." Internally, these foreign entrants are interested in deploying more expatriates and hiring younger employees "untainted" by local norms. With entrants' preference for 100 percent foreign ownership through wholly owned subsidiaries and acquisitions, their strategy centers on multinationals' superb resources (Meyer & Estrin, 2001; Uhlenbruck & de Castro, 2000) . In other words, since foreign entrants are not part of the domestic social, political, and economic networks to begin with, some of them may prefer arm's length transactions, instead of opaque, network-based, negotiated arrangements (Rajan & Zingales, 2000) , To the extent that these foreign entrants engage in some networking activities, they are likely to focus on lobbying host governments to create a more predictable and codified environment (Hillman & Hitt, 1999) .
Which set of strategic choices will be chosen depends on the institutional pressures foreign entrants face. Coming primarily from developed economies, foreign entrants are likely to have internalized the merits of market-based competition, leading to strong cognitive pressures to pursue such actions. Relative to the weak formal institutions governing incumbents and startups, the rules and regulations governing foreign entrants tend to be relatively more established in emerging economies, because governments typically pay more attention to the role foreign entrants play. Therefore, there may be some moderate regulative pressures for foreign entrants to engage in more rule-based exchange. The biggest driving force behind foreign entrants' strategic choices is likely to be the normative pressures they face. Foreign entrants confront conflicting normative pressures: they want to be isomorphic with both their global norms in favor of flexing their competitive muscles and the local norms in favor of networks and relationships during this phase (Rosenzweig & Singh, 1991) .
Although Hoskisson and colleagues conceptually argue that foreign entrants may have "a preference for more hierarchical governance structures" because of the lack of formal marketsupporting institutions (2000: 255), in empirical work other researchers have actually documented a relatively higher propensity to rely on less hierarchical entry modes (e.g., joint ventures) more often, at least during the initial transitions (Beamish, 1993; Lyles & Salk, 1996; Yan & Gray, 1994) . These findings thus highlight most foreign entrants' interest in creating a better fit with the institutional environments during this phase. Figure 3) 
Proposition 3a; During the early phase of transitions (between Tl and T3 in
STRATEGIC CHOICES DURING THE LATE PHASE OF TRANSITIONS
Approaching T3, the transitions toward more rule-based exchange are gradually required, because the returns from a network-based strategy increasingly diminish. At the same time, while formal rules are introduced, their effectiveness, from policy makers' standpoint, may be limited. In other words, prior to reaching T5, the benefits of relying on rule-based, impersonal exchange do not necessarily outweigh the costs, whereas the benefits of relying on networks and relationships may continue to be positive (albeit diminishing). At the same time, starting with the previous phase, the new norms centering on capability development are first introduced by fringe players, such as start-ups and foreign entrants, which initially have little influence on incumbents, the former central players prior to the transitions. However, as the transitions unfold, start-ups and foreign entrants gradually become more central players, thus asserting their norms in the organizational field and making market-based competition the new institutionalized practices (Leblebici et al., 1991: 333) . In this section I illustrate these changing dynamics.
Incumbent Firms
Although change may be in the air, incumbents, because of their deeper embeddedness within the former institutional context, are slower than other firms to recognize the value of market-based competition, and therefore more likely to stick with their relationship-based strategy longer (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996) . Specifically, with more formal market-supporting institutions, the regulative pressures to compel incumbents to move away from a networking strategy may have changed from weak to moderate. But these pressures may still not be strong enough to compel all (or most) incumbents to change their strategy (Oliver, 1992) . Similarly, the norinative and cognitive pressures for a more market-based strategy may become stronger relative to these pressures during the early phase of transitions, leading some (but not all) incumbents to focus more on capabilities independent of networks (Oliver, 1992) . However, given the substantial confusion and inertia, the emergence of such new norms and values is not smooth (Newman, 2000) , thus leading to different strategic choices.
The first strategic choice is to further strengthen and leverage existing ties. According to the behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963) , some firms are likely to engage in localized search that draws on their existing organizational routines and repertoires when responding to environmental upheaval. Thus, informal collaboration in loosely structured enterprise networks during the previous phase is increasingly transformed into a formal, unified, command-and-control structure through crossshare holdings, board interlocks, and tight cooperation (Peng, 2000: 98) .
In transition economies where formal business groups were not previously predominant, they started to emerge visibly-after a period of relying on informal networks-in China (Au, Peng, & Wang, 2000; Keister, 2000) and Russia (Perotti & Gelfer, 2001 ) in the 1990s. After liberalization-centered "policy shocks" were introduced in Chile and India, existing business groups significantly strengthened their network-based control over subsidiaries (Khanna & Palepu, 1999) . For organizations experienced in the networking game, an almost natural response, when facing environmental turbulence, would be to continue to do so.
A second strategic response is to restructure and develop new market-based capabilities. Both the push and pull effects may be at work here. On the one hand, triggered by performance problems, restructuring requires some "unlearning" of existing organizational routines (Oliver, 1992: 585) . As the economy becomes increasingly competitive and formal marketsupporting institutions are gradually adopted, relationships may only reach so far. Thus, unsatisfactory performance may push some incumbents to search for new competitive advantage (Filatotchev et al, 2000) . On the other hand, the success of domestic and foreign new entrants pulls some incumbents to imitate these new rivals (Lyles & Salk, 1996; Shenkar & Li, 1999) . For many incumbents, when marketbased competition becomes sufficiently strong, restructuring appears to be the only way out in the long run, because they are not likely to be able to muddle through permanently (McCarthy & Puffer, 1995) .
Given that both network-and market-based strategies are viable choices for incumbents, which strategy are incumbents more likely to choose? Relative to incumbents that continue with the network-based strategy, incumbents more likely to initiate restructuring seem to be distinguished by their firm size and age, ownership, and managers' age (Peng, 2000: 136) . First, whereas large firms tend to be older, structurally more complex, and laden with more inertia, small firms tend to be younger, have fewer slack resources, are more flexible, and may be more interested in deep restructuring. Second, incumbents having some foreign ownership may be more likely to initiate restructuring, because foreign investors may tolerate less inertia and have better access to resources that can facilitate restructuring. Finally, the age of top managers can be a good proxy for managers' outlook and capabilities (Hambrick 8E Mason, 1984) . Whereas most managers in emerging economies grew up and acquired most of their experience during the pretransition era, a younger generation of managers is on the rise. Compared with the "old guard," "new members with backgrounds and experiences that differ from existing members bring different interpretative frameworks and social definitions of behavior to the organization that act to diminish consensus and unquestioning adherence to taken-forgranted practices" (Oliver, 1992; 575) . In short, younger managers may lead to more restructuring at incumbent firms. (between T3 and T5 in Figure 3) , incumbent tirms that (1) 
Proposition 4: During the late phase of transitions
Entrepreneurial Start-Ups
Start-ups active during this phase include (1) those founded in the previous phase and (2) those founded in the more recent phase. For start-ups founded in the previous phase, the question now is how to sustain their competitive position. As they become more established, they are likely to focus increasingly on market-based capabilities, because beyond T3 the returns to networking may diminish and managers' time and efforts may be better spent developing market capabilities than engaging in excessive networking. For example, many entrepreneurial firms in China, which historically had linkages with local governments for their protection, are now distancing themselves from the intervention of the bureaucrats and concentrating more on developing distinctive competencies (Peng, 2001a: 103) . While the reguiafive pressures to push these firms for more market-based competition may have changed from weak to moderate, the normative and cognifive pressures may become increasingly strong, since new beliefs and values centered on market capabilities are likely to take hold among them.
For domestic new entrants starting in the current phase, they still need to establish network linkages with key players, in addition to having competitive strengths. The same logic for smaller firms around the world to enhance their legitimacy, by conforming to the social norms of teaming with larger and more powerful players, applies here (Aldrich, 1999) . New start-ups, regardless of their institutional environments, always need to have at least a minimal level of networks and connections. In other words, the normative and cognitive pressures to rely solely on competitive capabilities independent of networks may be moderate. Compared with forms of networking during the previous phase (with both managers and officials), networking in the current phase may focus more on professional ties with managers at other firms and less so with government officials. This is because as more transparent rules are being introduced, the need to interact with the government is reduced.
Proposition 5: During the late phase of transitions (between T3 and T5 in Figure 3) 
Foreign Entrants
During this phase, foreign entrants are likely to lead the efforts to compete on market capabilities, instead of networks. Recall that even during the previous phase, certain foreign entrants were already reluctant to join the local networking game and preferred to "go it alone" with wholly owned subsidiaries and acquisitions (Boisot & Child, 1999 ). It appears that foreign entrants increasingly prefer this strategy in the later, rule-based phase, as evidenced by numerous conversions of existing "first-generation" joint ventures into "second-generation" wholly owned subsidiaries (Peng, 2000: 233) and many new entries through acquisitions (Meyer & Estrin, 2001; Uhlenbruck & de Castro, 2000) . Formed by partners with different strategic calculations magnified by cultural differences, international joint ventures are inherently unstable (Peng & Shenkar, 2002) . However, when the formal institutions to support market competition are absent, many foreign firms that entered during the previous phase have little choice but to seek help from local partners (Beamish, 1993; Yan & Gray, 1994) . Over time, these foreign entrants gain more experience, which gives them more confidence to compete effectively (Luo & Peng, 1999) . Moreover, the regulatory environment becomes more predictable, thus making it (relatively) easier for these entrants to navigate the competitive waters by themselves.
It appears that the more aggressive the market liberalization efforts, the more likely foreign entrants will adopt an entry strategy centered on wholly owned subsidiaries and acquisitions. The comparison of Central Europe and China serves as a case in point. Although foreign investment only started to enter Central Europe in 1989, about 20 to 30 percent of the entrants opted for wholly owned subsidiaries by 1993. In contrast, while foreign investment first entered China in 1979, only approximately 3 percent of all foreign entrants in a span of 14 years (1979 to 1993) established wholly owned subsidiaries (Peng, 2000: 207) . It is apparent that the wholehearted reform measures adopted by Central European governments significantly lowered the psychological barriers for wholly owned subsidiaries, whereas the Chinese government's more hesitant approach, in which joint ventures were only approved during early stages of China's reform era (most of the 1980s), deterred numerous wholly owned subsidiaries. However, since China stiffened its resolve to embrace irreversible market reforms in the mid 1990s, the number of wholly owned subsidiaries now routinely rivals that of joint ventures (Peng, 2000: 232) .
Foreign entrants' strategic changes can be explained by the changing institutional pressures they confront. Given foreign entrants' inherently strong cognitive beliefs and values centered on market competition based on their experience in their home countries and other foreign markets, the improved regulatory environment in emerging economies, especially the part pertaining to foreign investment, is likely to generate strong regulative pressures for them to compete on capabilities. The normative pressures may also be strong, given that the norms of an increasing number of local competitors and other foreign entrants now converge on capabilities, thus leading to better legitimacy for this strategy.
Proposition 6a: During the late phase of transitions (between T3 and T5 in Figure 3) In summary, strategic choices change because some new, formal, market-supporting institutions result in stronger pressures for firms to engage in market competition. In other words, these institutions, designed to support increasingly complex impersonal exchange, lead to decreasing marginal returns to the previous network-based strategy, compelling many firms to convert to a new market-centered strategy.
PERFORMANCE IMPLICATIONS
Strategy is about making a difference in firm performance. In general, organizations able to align their strategies with their institutional environments-that is, those achieving strategic fit-are likely to achieve higher performance. However, failure to appreciate the institutional changes will make a previous fit obsolete under the new circumstances (Zajac et al., 2000) . Nowhere is this argument more forcefully borne out than in emerging economies. As these economies first open up, the rules of the game (or, specifically, the lack of formal rules) during the first phase of the transitions seem to suggest that "who you know is more important than what you know," implying that informal relationship assets are likely to be the primary driver of firm performance. Recently, however, as various economies have evolved toward the second, rule-based phase, relationships often have been found to be "necessary but insufficient for good performance" (Peng & Luo, 2000: 487) . As a result, strengths in market-based capabilities may become more important, implying that firms need both relational and competitive assets in order to survive and prosper.
Preliminary evidence of these changing dynamics is emerging. For example, in Chile, as reforms deepen, business groups, through extensive internal networking and coordination to achieve economies of scope, are still able to add value, but it is increasingly difficult for them to do so (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . In South Korea, as market competition intensifies, the performance of chaefaoi-affiliated firms, which strongly rely on cross-subsidizing through internal networks, steadily drops (Chang & Hong, 2000) . In China, one study shows that while managerial network variables explain approximately 18 percent of the variance in firm performance, "traditional" strategy variables independent of network effects (e.g., quality) are able to explain 38 percent of the performance variance (Peng, 2000: 259) , thus underscoring the importance of competitive capabilities as a driver of performance in the new phase of transitions.
Proposition 7: Betv^een Tl and T3 in Figure 3, These propositions help us understand the changing competitive dynamics in emerging economies by pointing out when networks and connections facilitate firm performance and when they may be unable to do so. For example, researchers have been puzzled by the persistence of network-based business groups in emerging economies, which seem to rely on connections and relationships to add value (Guillen, 2000; Perotti & Gelfer, 2001 ). Yet the evolution of institutional environments may diminish the value-creating potential of business groups, albeit slowly (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) . Overall, both scholars and practitioners in emerging economies need to raise a flag of caution when encountering simplistic, linear statements, such as "connections are all you need," "business groups add (or destroy) value," and "wholly owned subsidiaries are the way to go." Given the points of inflection above, the performance implications of different strategic choices are likely to differ as the transitions evolve.
DISCUSSION
Contributions and Implications
Attempting to make some sense of the broad patterns of institutional and strategic transitions permeating many emerging economies, this article makes two contributions. First, it integrates the convergent insights of institutional and strategic choice perspectives in a dynamic sense. Given that most existing research takes place in the West, which is relatively stable institutionally, a focus on emerging economies allows us to "vary institutional contexts"; otherwise, "it is difficult if not impossible to discern the effects of institutions on social structures and behaviors if all our cases are embedded in the same or very similar ones" (Scott, 1995: 146) . In this article I take on the challenge raised by Powell (1996: 297) by exploring how institutional transitions matter for strategic choices. In particular, I extend Child's (1972 Child's ( , 1997 ) and Oliver's (1991 Oliver's ( , 1992 work, highlighting the interdependence of choice and constraint in organizational behavior. I draw on Scott's (1995) three "pillars" as underlying sources of institutional pressures on strategic choices.
Moreover, this article serves as an initial step in paying explicit attention to the temporal dimension, building on Newman's (2000) analysis through a "temporal bracketing" approach (Langley, 1999) . While reducing the generalizability of the propositions across time, such an approach increases the precision of the predictions, at least within the specified period. Overall, this article extends some of my earlier work (Peng, , 20aib, 2002 Peng & Heath, 1996) , painting the broad contour of an institution-based view of business strategy.
Second, this article synthesizes a diverse but scattered body of literature on emerging economies to form a coherent theoretical contribution. I focus on the two critical phases that most emerging economies go through and document the impact of the points of inflection on strategic choices. Specifically, I explain and predict the mechanisms by which the importance of networks is gradually eclipsed by the importance of capabilities-a process previously speculated about but not specified (Hoskisson et al., 2000: 263; Peng, 2001b: 821) . This article thus highlights the reiafive decline of networks and connections (albeit still important) vis-d-vis competitive resources and capabilities and attributes this decline to a function of the rise of formal market-supporting institutions. Finally, I also overcome the typically isolated nature of research on emerging economies (e.g., only studying incumbents) by arguing that strategic choices for the three major types of firms, which may constitute an organizational field, are identifiable and predictable within a single unifying framework.
A number of implications for public and business policies emerge. A critical insight for policy makers is that the fundamental, sweeping nature of the transitions inevitably leads to insti-tutional uncertainties. Simply enacting marketfriendly rules is not enough. The next hurdle remains in how to enhance their enforcement. Practitioners navigating the transition process are essentially competing on the "edge" (Brown & Eisenhardt, 1998) , between the past and future. The inability to apply a simple linear model suggests that managers-both domestic and foreign-need new tools to model such nonlinear complexity. The key challenge is to anticipate changes when possible, probe aggressively, and react quickly. The best managers expect strategy to shift over time by constantly deciphering the changes in the "big picture" and by being willing to take advantage of new opportunities. As emerging economies evolve, the best-performing firms seem to be those that convert the gains from the previous, relationship-based phase into market-centered resources and capabilities. Firms that fail to realize the passing of their time are likely to fall behind or go out of business.
Extensions Beyond Emerging Economies
The propositions raise several questions regarding their boundary conditions. First, do they apply to all firms? Given the resource-based logic on firm heterogeneity (Barney, 1991; Peng, 2001b) , arguing that all firms of a particular type during a given phase behave in the same way is certainly indefensible. For example, while the network-based strategy is argued to be a predominant strategy for incumbents during the early phase of transitions, it "should not be confused as the oniy strategy" (Peng & Heath, 1996: 517) . My arguments simply suggest a most likely (but not the only) strategic choice-in other words, the central tendency-for a given type of firm in a certain period.
Second, do the propositions apply to all industries and countries? Overall, the more dynamic an industry is, the faster the transitions will be from a relationship-based phase to a rule-based phase. Thus, points D and E in Figure 3 may be reached sooner for industries exposed to international trade and investment, which need to conform to a set of international norms, than for industries still dominated by governmentprotected incumbents (e.g., railroads). A similar logic can be applied to different emerging economies. The more developed economies of Chile, Poland, and South Korea may reach T3 sooner than the less developed economies of Belarus, Indonesia, and Vietnam. In a nutshell, each industry and country may have curves similar in shape to those portrayed in Figure 3 , but different in slope.
Third, beyond emerging economies, how does the perspective developed apply? I argue that the model portrayed in Figure 3 can also be applied to developed economies. The recent rise of e-commerce companies serves as a case in point. In the absence of formal institutions, entrepreneurs are initially forced to rely almost exclusively on informal personal connections to access financing (e.g., venture capital). The government is initially reluctant to formulate specialized legislation to govern these transactions, in part because of the high costs of developing such formal institutions. However, as this organizational form matures, these firms increasingly turn to formal capital markets (e.g., initial public offerings). At the same time, the government becomes more interested in specialized formal institutions (e.g.. Electronic Signature Act), whose costs are likely to decrease now given the expanded scale and scope of these transactions. Moreover, the dramatic crash since March 2000 indicates how soon the critical time T3 may be reached, beyond which a lack of competitive capabilities is likely to quickly lead to downfall.
Finally, it is important to note that while many firms in emerging economies move toward a more market-centered strategy, their counterparts in developed economies seem to have increasingly embraced a network-based strategy. Four points are worth highlighting. First, "formal rules, in even the most developed economy, make up a small (although very important) part of the sum of constraints that shape choices," and "informal constraints are pervasive features of modern economies" (North, 1990: 39) . Second, not all networks are the same. Whereas networks in emerging economies tend to be embedded in interpersonal ties, networks in developed economies, supported by more established formal institutions, tend to be more calculative, with more codification and transparency (Hite & Hesterly, 2001 ). Third, we can extend Figure 3 by suggesting that, past time T5, the benefits of arm's length transactions do not go up indefinitely and may plateau and experience some decline because of certain transaction hazards (Williamson, 1985) . At that point a further shift (not shown in Figure 3 ) toward a network-based strategy may be called for (Powell, 1990) . Last, in practice, network-and market-based strategies are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Researchers increasingly suggest a "networks-ascapabilities" perspective, which blurs the conceptual boundaries separating these two strategies (Gulati et al., 2000) .
Future Research Directions
First, how do we identify the various points in time (Tl to T5), especially the critical T3? Such a task is likely to be very challenging (Newman, 2000: 616) . For example, throughout transition economies, discussions such as "Are the transitions over?" (i.e.. Where is T3?) started almost immediately after the transitions were initiated (Lavigne, 1996) . It is now clear that such discussions are premature and that the transitions are "far from over" (Stiglitz, 1999: 27) . Overall, it seems safe to suggest that it may take a generation or more to reach T5 and that, at present, no emerging economy has reached this point. As a result, longitudinal studies spanning several decades, such as those by Dobbin and Dowd (1997) , covering ninety-eight years (1825 to 1922), and Ruef and Scott (1998) , covering forty-six years (1945 to 1990) , may be necessary.
Second, although in this article I implicitly assume that the relationship-based phase will transition to a rule-based phase, this assumption itself may be subject to debate. Political backlash and tension are likely to result in some possible reversals. However, it seems reasonable to suggest that, in today's increasingly integrated global economy, complete divergence from the move toward a rule-based phase may not be feasible in the long run. Therefore, what seems more likely is "cross-vergence" or some kind of hybrid (e.g., the blurring of network-and market-based strategies) not yet well understood (Young et al., 2002}. Third, while it is generally acknowledged that "institutions determine the performance of economies" (North, 1990: 137) , what creates efficient institutions is less well known. Although the determination of the government (and, in some cases, international organizations^) may be critFor example, in 1997 the International Monetary Fund demanded that Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand implement major financial reforms. In 1997 the European Union ical, such top-down institutional pressures may not be enough. Firms are not likely to be passive; instead, they may delay or accelerate the emergence of formal institutions (Oliver, 1991) . In future work researchers may need to explore how organizations influence institutions, thus shedding new light on how these two coevolve (Child, 1997) .
Finally, although in this article I have opted for a generalization approach, through a multinational triangulation process, it is important to caution against overgeneralization. Transition economies may go through institutional changes that are somewhat different from other emerging economies. Since doing business via relationships is more consistent with cultural values in some countries than others, in future research the role of national and regional cultures in interacting with institutions and strategies may also need to be incorporated (Chen, Peng, & Saparito, 2002; Shenkar & von Glinow, 1994) .
CONCLUSION
My central argument in this article is that organizational research focusing on business competition in emerging economies will not only create an analytical framework enabling us to better understand how strategic choices are made and changed during fundamental institutional transitions but also will enrich the debates in public policies and managerial practices on how to deal more effectively with these challenges. In conclusion, if this article could contain only one message, I would like it to be a sense of the staggering power that the changing dynamics of institutional transitions have to make changes in strategic choices inevitableboth for domestic and foreign firms participating in these transitions and for economies embracing these transitions.
